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Norton: Norton: New Disparate Impact Analysis

The New Disparate Impact Analysis in
Employment Discrimination:
Emanuel v. Marsh' in Light of Watson,
Atonio3 and the Failed Civil
Rights Act of 1990
I. LNTRODUCTON

Title VII of the Civil Rights 'Aci of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Under
Title VII, a determination of unlawful employment discrimination may be

based on either disparate treatment analysis or disparate impact analysis.'
Disparate treatment theory requires a showing that the employer intended to
discriminate against an employee on a prohibited basis, such as the employee's race or sex,6 while disparate impact theory does not require a showing
of discriminatory intent.7 Instead, disparate impact theory requires a showing
that a facially neutral employment practice, without a proper business
justification, operated to adversely affect a member of a protected group.8

1. 828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987).
2. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
3. Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-18, J, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(e)17 (1982).
5. Disparate impact analysis and disparate treatment analysis stem from § 703(a)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment; because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
6. Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
7. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power

Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. Griggs,401 U.S. at 431.
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The Supreme Court first used disparate impact analysis in employment
discrimination cases in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.9 and disparate treatment
analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.10 Controversy resulted over
the scope and application of the analyses, including whether the nature of the
challenged employment practice should dictate which mode of analysis,
disparate impact or disparate treatment, should be used to determine if illegal
discrimination occurred." Specifically, the question became whether courts
should use disparate impact or disparate treatment analysis when dealing with
subjective employment decisions.' 2 In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Truste and Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 4 the Supreme Court answered
the question by holding that subjective employment practices should by
analyzed under a modified disparate impact analysis.
This Comment will examine the application of the radically changed
disparate impact analysis of Watson and Atonio, through an analysis of an
Eighth Circuit case, Emanuel v. Marsh.15 In Emanuel, a pre-Watson and
Atonio opinion, the Eighth Circuit refused to apply disparate impact analysis
9. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
11. In determining whether disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective
employment practices, the circuits have split. The Fourth Circuit traditionally has not
applied disparate impact theory to subjective employment practices. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
The Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have reached internally conflicting results.
See Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (disallowed application); Griffin
v. Board of Regents, 795 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1986) (refused to apply disparate impact
analysis); Regner v. City of Chicago, 789 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowed the
application); Page v. United States Indus., 726 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowed the
application of disparate impact to subjective employment criteria); Gilbert v. City of
little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowed application of impact analysis),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. 668 F.2d 795 (5th
Cir. 1982) (disallowing the application).
The remaining circuits allowed the application of impact analysis to subjective
employment criteria. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir.
1987); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d
500 (10th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Zahorik v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1984); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.,
Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982).
12. See supra note 11. An employment practice is considered subjective if it
involves an opinion, perhaps in the form of a supervisory review rating or a judgment
based on an interview.
13. 490 U.S. 642 (1988).
14. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
15. 828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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to subjective employment practices. 6 The court found for the defendant/employer after applying disparate treatment analysis and finding no
intentional discrimination.' 7 The Watson and Atonio courts subsequently
concluded that courts should analyze subjective employment practices with
disparate impact theory, but drastically altered the burdens of proof.
In this Comment, the author argues that the circuit court in Emanuel
would reach the same finding of "no illegal discrimination' 8 using Watson
and Atonio's new disparate impact analysis as it did using disparate treatment
analysis. This exercise will illustrate the formidable barriers facing employment discrimination plaintiffs under the new disparate impact analysis.

Finally, this Comment addresses the failed Civil Rights Act of 1990, focusing
on the attempt to restore the burdens of proof in disparate impact analysis to
their pre-Watson and pre-Atonio status.

II. FAcTs OF EMANUEL
Plaintiffs Alston A. Emanuel and Leon Paige brought a class action
against the United States Army for employment discrimination based on
race.' 9 The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Army Troop Support and
Aviation Material Readiness Command (TSARCOM) either persuaded them
not to apply for promotions or denied them promotions based on their race.2
Emanuel, a black male civilian, was employed as a packaging specialist
at TSARCOM in St. Louis, Missouri.21 He sought a promotion in 1975, but
was denied the promotion in favor of Snyder, a white male with comparable
training, skill, and experience.? Emanuel filed a complaint alleging racial
discrimination with the U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency
(USACARA), an independent agency that investigates potential employment
discrimination by the Army.'
USACARA concluded that Emanuel's
supervisors had discriminated against him and the Army accepted
USACARA's recommendation to retroactively promote Emanuel.24 Snyder,
the white male originally promoted in Emanuel's place, retained his promotion
and was transferred.?

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Snyder and Emanuel performed well in their respective positions in the
following years and both received awards recognizing their contributions.'
In 1980, Snyder and Emanuel once again applied for a promotion where only
one opening was available.' Emanuel had temporarily held the position to
be filled, but Snyder received the promotion.2
The individual who promoted Snyder over Emanuel testified that he
based the promotion decision in part on a rating given to individual employees, a subjective rating based on the opinion of the employee's supervisor.29
Emanuel alleged that his supervisor, the same person who discriminated
against him in 1976 according to USACARA, had given him unjustifiably low
ratings based on his race3 An Army review panel agreed with Emanuel's
contention of an incorrect rating and, as a result of the panel's findings, his
rating was raised.3 ' Once again, Emanuel filed a racial discrimination
complaint with USACARA and the agency once again found that the Army

discriminated against Emanuel based on his race.3"

USACARA noted

specifically that Emanuel's qualifications had been improperly evaluated by
his supervisor and that this subjective employment device, the supervisory
rating, caused the promotion of Snyder over Emanuel.3 This time, however,
the Army rejected the agency's conclusion of racial discrimination and refused
to act on Emanuel's behalf.34 Emanuel filed a Title VII suit in federal
district court seeking a promotion and back-pay. 5
The district court applied disparate treatment analysis and held that a
primafacie case of racial discrimination had been made, but also found that
the Army had rebutted the presumption by articulating "convincing nondiscriminatory reasons in support of its [promotion] decision."3 6 The district
court found for the Army, concluding that Emanuel had not met his burden
of proving that the Army intentionally discriminated because he had not

26. Id.
27. Id. at 440.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The review panel did not inquire as to discrimination. They simply found
that Emanuel deserved a higher rating than he had received. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 440-41. Emanuel originally filed the suit as a class action, but after his
retirement, Paige was substituted for Emanuel as the class representative. In the
present case, Paige's appeal from the district court's order denying class certification
was denied. Id. at 441.
36. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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proven that the Army's offered reasong were a pretext for racial discrimination. On appeal, Emanuel argued that the district court erred in refusing
to apply disparate impact analysis to the discrimination claim.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's use of disparate treatment
analysis and its finding of "no illegal discrimination." 39 The court noted that
the challenged employment practice, supervisory review and rating, was
subjective in nature. 4° The court held that when an employer utilizes
subjective employment procedures, disparate treatment analysis, not disparate
impact analysis as Emanuel contended, should be applied; and that, under a
treatment analysis, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find
that the Army had not discriminated against Emanuel based on race. 4'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, prohibits
employment discrimination and the use of criteria which tend to deprive an
individual of opportunities in employment based on the individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.42

Two distinct causes of action

carrying different primafacie elements and different burdens of proof sprung
from this Title VII mandate.43

First, "disparate treatment" analysis requires that a plaintiff show
intentional discrimination." Plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing:
1) that she is a member of a ptotected group; 2) that she applied and was
qualified for the position in question; 3) that she was subsequently rejected;
and 4) that the employer continued to seek similarly qualified applicants for
the position.4 5 If the plaintiff makes the prima facie case, the burden shifts

37. Md
38. Id at 439. Emanuel also argued that the Army should be estopped from
litigating the qualifications issue with regard to the white civilian promoted instead of
Emanuel and that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous. Id. The estoppel
argument is based on a study conducted by the Army which rated Emanuel as more
qualified than the white male who received the promotion for which Emanuel applied.

Id.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 439.
Id.
at 442.
Id. at 442-3.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)

(1982).

43. Id.
44. See McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1971).
45. Id.at 802.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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to the employer/defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the

rejection.4' If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant's articulated reason for rejection is a mere pretext for
discrimination based on race or another disfavored justification.47 The prima
facie case and the defendant's burden are easily satisfied and the ultimate
issue generally centers on whether the plaintiff is able to show that 4 defendant's stated rationale is a mere pretext for intentional discrimination. 8
Due to a plaintiff's difficult requirement of meeting the ultimate burden
in "disparate treatment" cases, plaintiffs 'have preferred "disparate impact"
analysis. Traditionally, a plaintiff made a prima facie case for a disparate
impact claim if she showed that a facially neutral employment practice, such
as a standardized test, had a discriminatory impact on a protected group, such
as the non-hiring of a higher percentage of women than men evidenced by a
statistical imbalance in the work-force. 49 The burden then shifted to the
defendant who could attempt either to rebut the showing of discriminatory
impact, 5° perhaps by showing that the plaintiff had not used the proper labor
pool in her proof of the statistical imbalance, or to justify the challenged
practice by proving that the challenged practice is a business necessity or is
at least job-related. 51
As noted above, the Eighth Circuit applied disparate treatment analysis
to subjective employment procedures in Emanuel, rejecting plaintiff's
arguments for the application of disparate impact analysis5 2 At that time,
the circuits were split as to whether subjective practices should be analyzed
under treatment or impact theory. 3 Courts discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of applying disparate impact analysis to subjective employment
practices and a current discussion of these advantages and disadvantages
will benefit the upcoming analysis.
Arguing for the application of disparate impact to subjective practices,
plaintiffs noted that subjective selection methods such as supervisors'
opinions, which may be influenced by prejudicial stereotypes, are as likely to

46. Id.
47. Id. at 804.
48. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1980);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
49. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
50. Defendant can challenge the validity of a plaintiff's statistical proof in an
attempt to show that no actionable impact occurred. See Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 (1977).
51. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
52. Emanuel, 828 F.2d at 442.
53. See supra note 11.
54. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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result in discriminatory effects as are objective methods such as standardized
tests.O
Thus, the discriminatory effects of both objective and subjective
practices should be actionable under the same theory, disparate impact theory.
Disparate impact theory should be utilized because a plaintiff should not face
the more difficult requirement of proving intentional discrimination under
disparate treatment theory simply because the employer utilizes subjective
employment practices."
If courts use treatment analysis simply because an employer uses
subjective employment methods, employers could avoid all impact claims by
inserting supervisory reviews or interview scores, which are considered
subjective procedures, into their hiring or promoting practices. According to
the Supreme Court in Watson v. FortWorth Bank & Trust, an employer could
convert its employment procedures to "subjective methods" simply by
introducing a single subjective employment practice into her existing
employment practicesY7 Thus, employers could adopt a single subjective
practice and avoid disparate impact analysis, which in effect would isolate the
employer from liability unless. plaintiffs could show that the employer
intentionally discriminated using disparate treatment analysis. In effect, a
crafty employer could eliminate altogether the possibility of disparate impact
litigation and force plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination if courts
require that subjective employment practices be analyzed with disparate
impact theory.

Employers argue that courts must analyze subjective employment
methods with disparate treatment theory only, because defending subjective
employment practices under disparate impact theory would be nearly
impossible. Employers claim that subjective employment practices, such as
ratings based on supervisory opinions, would be impractical to validate under
disparate impact theory's "business necessity" burden.58 In short, employers
argue that they need subjective employment practices to evaluate important
subjective employee qualities such as attitude and tact, but they fear that a
court would not find these traits to be business necessities. 59
Therefore, to avoid liability under disparate impact analysis, employers
claim that they in effect must adopt quotas to insure that a statistical
imbalance does not occur. The Supreme Court, however, outlawed the use of
quotas unless the employer can demonstrate a compelling justification. 60 The
threatened use of quotas is a weak rationale for the abandonment of disparate

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Watson, 487 U.S. at 989.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 992.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 467, 499 (1989).
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impact analysis with subjective employment practices, considering that it
likely is an illegal response to potential litigation pursuant to the wellestablished, disparate impact analysis. In short, the threat to commit an illegal
act, using quotas, should not influence the application of an established legal
doctrine, disparate impact analysis, in favor of those individuals, the
employers, threatening the illegal act."1 The Watson Court, however, pointed
to the fear of encouraging the use of quotas as a rationale, not for abandoning
the analysis of subjective employment practices with disparate impact theory,
but for formulating a new disparate impact theory----a new theory that
ironically favors those individuals threatening use of the illegal quota system,
the employers.
IV. SuBjEcTIVE EMPLOYMENT PRACTIcES AND THE
NEw DISPARATE IMPACT:
WATSON AND AToNO
A. The Watson Compromise
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,63 a bank denied Watson, a black
teller, promotions to supervisory positions in favor of similarly qualified white
applicants on four occasions. 64 Watson alleged that the bank, which utilized
subjective employment practices, discriminated against her on the basis of race
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65 Despite Watson's
arguments that disparate impact analysis be used, the district court applied
disparate treatment analysis and found for the defendant/bank.' On appeal,
Watson argued that the district court should have applied disparate impact
analysis to her claims, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed and noted that promotion
systems which use subjective criteria are correctly examined with disparate
67
treatment analysis.
The United States Supreme Court granted Watson's petition for a writ of
certiorari6 to determine whether subjective employment practices should be
analyzed under disparate impact theory or disparate treatment theory. The
Court agreed with Watson and overturned the Fifth Circuit's ruling that

61. See Middleton, Challenging Discriminatory Guesswork: Does Impact
Analysis Apply? 42 OKLA. L REv. 187, 226 n. 226 (1989).
62. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
63. Id. at 977.
64. Id. at 982.
65. Id. at 983.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 984.
68. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 483 U.S. 1004 (1987).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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disparate impact theory should be used with subjective practices. 69 The
Court, in accordance with a rationale discussed above, found that if impact
analysis were not applicable to subjective practices, an employer could avoid
defending against impact analysis claims simply by including a single
subjective employment practice7
The insertion of the discretionary
subjective procedure into the hiring or promoting practice would make the
overall process subjective in nature. 1 Thus, under disparate treatment
theory, the employer could lighten its burden to merely "articulating a
legitimate non-discriminatory rationale,"' 2 as opposed to "proving business
necessity" under impact theory. The adoption of a subjective employment
practice would have allowed an employer to isolate itself from liability for
discrimination, unless the plaintiff could show that the discrimination was
intentional. 73 As will be discussed fully below, the method for proving that
the discrimination is, in fact, intentional is to show that the employer's
articulated non-discriminatory rationale for the challenged employment
practice served as a mere pretext for discrimination.
The Watson Court recognized that subjective practices often discriminate
illegally due to prejudicial stereotypes and subconscious feelings that do not
amount to intentional discrimination. Due to the fear that the discriminatory
effects of these stereotypes would be immunized in a disparate treatment
analysis, the Court held that disparate impact analysis must be applied to
subjective employment practices. 4
To this point, the Watson opinion reads as a victory for Civil Rights
activists. However, after the Court unanimously 75 mandated that subjective
employment practices be analyzed according to impact theory, a plurality of
the Court compromised its decision by radically changing the evidentiary
76
standards used in impact theory.
The Watson court recognized the undesirable possibility of employers
using quota systems, which are expressly prohibited under Title VII,77 to
insure that their subjective employment practices did not result in statistical
disparity and ensuing litigation.78 In short, the Watson court held that

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Watson, 487 U.S. at 999.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 989.
See McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.

75. The decision was 8-0. Justice Kennedy did not participate because he became

a member of the Court after the oral arguments.
76. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).

78. Watson, 487 U.S. at 992.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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disparate impact analysis should apply to subjective practices,79 but found
validity in defendant's "quota threatening" argument and used that finding as
a preliminary rationale for changing the burdens of proof in impact theory in
favor of the defendant/employer.' As a result, Watson makes it much more
difficult for a plaintiff to make her prima facie case, drastically narrows the
difference between treatment and impact analysis, and in effect creates
formidable barriers that few plaintiffs will be able to cross.
Under the new impact theory of Watson, a plaintiff makes a prima facie
case by identifying the specific employment practice that caused the statistical
disparity8 1 and by showing that the statistics are sufficient to infer that the
challenged practice caused the disparity. Once the primafacie case is met,
a defendant/employer need only "produce" evidence that "its employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons."' -Traditionally, a
defendant under impact analysis had the burden of "proving" business
necessity as opposed to merely "producing" a legitimate business rationale.m
The Watson plurality also stated that the ultimate burden remains on the
plaintiff at all times, noting that the Griggs decision should not be read to
imply that the ultimate burden of proof could be shifted to defendant."
Once a defendant meets its burden of production, a plaintiff must prove that
an alternative employment device would serve the employer's interests equally
well with less discriminatory impact and that the employer did not adopt the
alternative device. 7
In his partial concurrence, Justice Blackmun asserted that the evidentiary
''
standards set forth by the plurality were clearly "contradicted by our cases. 8
Blackmun noted the similarities in evidentiary standards in the plurality's new
impact analysis and the traditional treatment analysis.8 9 Similar to a

79. Id. at 991.
80. Id. at 991-93.
81. Id. at 994. Before Watson, a plaintiff shifted the burden of persuasion to the
defendant under impact theory by merely showing a statistical disparity in the
employer's workforce. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The burden then shifted to the
employer to prove business necessity. Id.
82. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95.
83. Id. at 998.
84. Compare Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, with Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
85. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
86. Watson, 487 U.S. at 997.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1000-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and Marshall,
JJ.) Justice Stevens concurred separately, noting that it was unwise and unnecessary
to formulate a new set of evidentiary standards at this time. Id. at 1011.
89. Id. at 1001.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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defendant "articulating a legitimate business rationale" in disparate treatment
analysis, a defendant under the new impact analysis must meet a mere burden
of production after plaintiff has made her prima facie case.'
Blackmun recognized that in a traditional impact analysis, the burden of
proof shifted to the defendant because plaintiff had already established in her
primafacie case that discrimination existed.9 ' The onus should therefore fall
on the defendant to justify the proven discriminatory effect. 2 The Watson
Court's compromise, which allowed subjective employment devices to be
analyzed under impact theory but changed the evidentiary standards in favor
of the defendant/employer, is a compromise only in appearance. In effect,
Watson gives a clear advantage to the defendant/employer.
The changes in evidentiary standards are so drastic that the resolution of
the debate regarding subjective employment practices in impact versus
treatment theory becomes meaningless in a practical sense. A plaintiff capable
of winning a discrimination case under the new impact analysis of Watson
could also win a case under disparate treatment theory, due to the practical
effects of Watson's compromising, pro-employer evidentiary shift in disparate
impact analysis. The following detailed examination of the Watson shift will
clarify further the new disparate impact theory's uncanny similarity to
traditional disparate treatment theory and will illustrate the practical uselessness of Watson's ruling that this new impact analysis should be applied to
subjective employment practices.
Under the new disparate impact theory, after the plaintiff makes her
prima facie case and the defendant articulates a legitimate business rationale
for the challenged practice, the plaintiff must show that an alternative nondiscriminatory practice will serve the same purpose for the employer as did
the challenged practice. This is remarkably similar to a plaintiff's ultimate
burden of showing "pretext for intentional discrimination" in treatment
analysis. In fact, the only way to prove that the defendant's stated rationale
is a pretext for intentional discrimination is to identify a practice, alternative
to those used by the employer, that would have served the employer's interest
equally as well as the challenged practice.
The Supreme Court's merging of disparate impact and treatment theories
became more obvious when the Court next encountered an employment
discrimination issue in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.

90. Id. at 1004.
91. Id.
92. Id. There are also practical reasons for keeping the burden of proof on the
defendant, such as better access to information regarding employment practices and
mechanics of the employment device in question.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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B. Atonio Extends and Clarifies Watson
The facts of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio93 demonstrate that racial

discrimination served as the norm, not the exception, in defendant's Alaskan
salmon canneries. In defendant's canneries, a privileged class of primarily
white workers held the vast majority of the cannery positions, which are

considered skilled labor positions. 4 A group predominately consisting of
Filipinos and non-white Alaskans held the non-cannery positions, which are
considered unskilled labor positions.95 Based on the distinction of skilled
versus unskilled labor, the whites received higher pay and better benefits than
the non-whites. 96
At the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit held that subjective employment
practices were properly analyzed under disparate impact theory. The court
followed the traditional application of impact theory and held that once
plaintiff makes his prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant to prove the business necessity of the challenged practice. 97
Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 98
The plurality of Watson, along with new Reagan-appointee Justice
Kennedy, extended the evidentiary standards for subjective employment
criteria of Watson to all disparate impact claims. 99 The Court emphasized
that the burden of proof is to remain with the plaintiff at all times and that the
employer must meet a burden of production, not of proof."
Thus, a
defendant need only assert that it based the employment practice on a
legitimate business consideration. 1'
The Atonio court elaborated on the "alternative employment practice"
stage created by Watson, which a plaintiff may use to prove her case after the
defendant has met her burden of producing a legitimate employment rationale
for the challenged practice.' 2 Atonio noted that the alternative practice

93. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
94. Id. at 2119.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2119-20.
97. Id.
98. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
99. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
100. Id.
101. Id The Court also attacked plaintiff's use of statistical evidence and
remanded the case with instructions as to the proper determination of a disparate
impact claim. Id. at 2121-24. The Court also noted that a plaintiff must specifically
identify the challenged employment practice which gave rise to the disparate impact.
Id. at 2124.
102. Id. at 2127.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
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must be equally effective and that factors such as potential cost to the
employer must be considered in determining the legitimacy of the alternative."03 The Court also noted that the plaintiff would prove his case if the
employer refused to adopt the plaintiff's offered alternatives, because such a
refusal would provide evidence that the employer adopted the challenged
practice for discriminatory purposes. 104 This position clearly makes "intent"
critical to impact analysis.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens called the majority opinion the "latest'
sojourn into judicial activism."" °s Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent,
noted that the Court has taken "major strides backwards in the battle against
Perhaps the greatest backward stride is that the
race discrimination."" °
plurality opinion of Watson, which unadvisably upset the established standard
Another backward stride is
of proof in Title VII cases, is now the law.'
that a plaintiff after Atonio must present the specific employment practice that
caused the statistical disparity, even though such proof often is impossible for
a plaintiff to obtain."° A reasonable interpretation of this requirement is
that a multiplicity of practices may only be challenged if plaintiff can
demonstrate how "each" practice creates a disparate impact in the composition
of the defendant's work-force.' °9 It may be argued that the majority opinion
intends to allow a group of practices to be considered a single practice for this
purpose, especially since "practices" (plural) is used at one point in the
opinion." 0 But in his dissent, Blackmun noted his belief that the majority
opinion will be interpreted rigidly, such that a plaintiff must prove the causal
nexus between "each" challenged practice and the statistical disparity."'
As noted above, the Court is merging disparate treatment and impact
theories," especially in the practical sense of what must be proven for a
plaintiff to win. Atonio provided evidence of this merger by noting that a
plaintiff may be able to win even if the defendant meets its burden of
producing a legitimate employment rationale.1 3 If a plaintiff offers a nondiscriminatory, alternative practice to the employer that represents the same

103. Id. at 2124-25.
104. Id. at 2126-27.
105. Id. at 2127-28.
106. Id. at 2136.
107. Id.
108. Id. Blackmun also felt it was a great error that the opinion barred the use
of internal work-force comparisons in the making of plaintiff's prima facie case. Id.
109. Id. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2125.
111. Id. at 2136.
112. See supra section IV A.
113. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
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interests to the employer as the challenged discriminatory practice and the
employer refuses to adopt plaintiff's proposal, plaintiff has shown that the
employer used the challenged practice as a mere pretext for intentional
discrimination. At this point, the employer has chosen the discriminatory
'practice over the non-discriminatory alternative and obviously is discriminating intentionally. Showing this intentional discrimination is clearly the same
as showing intentional discrimination in treatment theory.

V. ANALYSIS
To better understand the nearly impenetrable barriers the new adverse
114
impact theory imposes on plaintiffs, the facts of Emanuel v. Marsh
will
now be analyzed in fight of Watson and Atonio. Under current law,11 5 a
court would handle Emanuel's facts differently than did the Eighth Circuit
originally. However, the outcome would be the same-a finding of no illegal
discrimination." 6
A court would analyze the subjective promotion criteria in Emanuel,
which were ratings based on supervisors' opinions, under the new impact
theory" 7 instead of treatment theory as did the Eighth Circuit."' First,
one must assume that the court would accept Emanuel's statistical proof of
discriminatory effect. Emanuel would be able to meet his initial burden of
identifying the precise practice that gave rise to the disparate impact, because
the individual who made the promotion testified that he based his decision on
the challenged supervisory rating." 9 However, had Emanuel not been privy
to the lower supervisory rating he had received or not known that the rating
was relied on by the promoter, he would not have made the primafacie case.
It is unclear whether Emanuel knew the promoter relied on the rating prior to
his testimony;" but if he did not, Emanuel would not have made the prima
facie case because he probably would not have been able to identify the
specific practice that caused the discrimination.
Next, defendant's burden of producing a legitimate non-discriminatory

rationale would easily be met. Defendant could assert that the supervisory
reports are used because they incorporate important intangible employment

114.
115.
Ct. 2115
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

828 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1987).
The most recent case dealing with adverse impact theory is Atonio, 109 S.
(1989).
Emanuel, 828 F.2d at 443.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 979.
Emanuel, 828 F.2d at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id.
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factors such as the overall attitude of the employee. 1 Since an employee
seeking a supervisory position such as the one Emanuel sought'" should
have a good attitude, defendant's production burden would be met. This
illustrates the transparent nature of defendant's burden because certain generic
rationales, such as the need for a good attitude, are virtually foolproof in that
they are applicable almost universally to employment situations and they will
be considered legitimate business interests.
Finally, Emanuel could offer a practice, alternative to the challenged
supervisory review, that would serve the same business purpose as the review,
but with less discriminatory impact.12 It is unlikely that an objective test
could measure an employee's attitude equally as well as a supervisor who had
observed the employee, especially considering that no employee applying for
promotion will admit to having a bad attitude. Perhaps as an alternative, a
court would allow an employer to interview an employee's co-workers to help
determine the applicant's attitude. Even if a court ignored such potential
problems as voting favorably only for one's friends, or group members voting
favorably only for other group members, which could create even greater
morale problems, the suggestion still might not meet the burden under the
dicta of Atonio. The court in Atonio recognized in dicta that cost and other
burdens were factors to be considered in determining the adequacy of the
proposed alternativeYn 4 Undoubtedly, the defendant would argue that such
an alternative does not equally serve its interests because interviewing coworkers is too expensive and inefficient due to the loss of working hours.
Furthermore, an employer would argue that it is not a good practice to have
employees overly concerned with their co-workers' attitudes. Thus, such a
suggestion does not equally serve the employer's interests as did the
supervisory review and rating system.
Based on the dicta from Atonio calling for deference to the employer's
chosen practices12 and the other barriers discussed above, it is unlikely that
a plaintiff in Emanuel's position would be successful. Thus, a case such as
Emanuel, which the appellate court recognized could have gone either way
after analyzing the case under treatment theory, 12 becomes an obvious
failure under the new impact theory.

121. Indeed an employer may justify every subjective employment practice by
alleging a relationship to attitude.
122. Emanuel, 828 F.2d at 439.
123. Alonio, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
124. .k4 at 2127.
125. Id.
126. Emanuel, 828 F.2d at 443.
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VI. CONGRESS REACTS
A leading critic of the pro-employer shift in the Supreme Court's
decisions noted that the opinions appear to be "chapters in an ideological
crusade" aimed at inhibiting minorities and women from proving violations of
civil rights laws. 12 This mode of thought gave rise to the Fair Employment
Reinstatement Act, which later came to be known as the Civil Rights Act of
1990.
Bills in both houses of Congress, S. 2104 and H.R. 4000, aimed at
overturning the effects of several Supreme Court decisions including Atonio
and Watson received early widespread support. 8 Both bills specifically
targeted the altered burdens of proof in disparate impact analysis as mandated
by Atonio and proposed to restore the defendant's burden in disparate impact
cases to that of "proving business necessity."' Specifically, section 703 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to be amended to make an employment
practice unlawful if the complaining party could show that the practice
resulted in a disparate impact on a protected group and the employer failed "to
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity. '"'n This
amendment would have reestablished defendant's burden as "proving business
necessity," the same burden created by the Griggs Court almost twenty years
ago.13
Over an eight month span, S. 2104 and H.R. 4000 served as the topic of
numerous Congressional hearings.132 After engaging in the compromise and
accommodation process, the Senate and the House passed respective bills and
the compromise process continued during the conference committee's
deliberations.13 The bill, as it existed following the conference committee's

127. William L Taylor, Senior Editor, 4 Cv. RTs. MONITOR, No. 2 (Fall-Summer
1989).
128. S. 2104,101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990), had 38 co-sponsors as of 2/9/90 and
H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), had 123 co-sponsors as of 217/90.
129. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.

(1990). The appellate court inAtonio stated the law of adverse impact theory in a way
which may soon come to fruition in the form of legislation. The court of appeals held

that disparate impact analysis is applicable to subjective employment practices. The
court retained the burdens-of proof of the pre-Watson cases, as the defendant had to
'"prove" business necessity once plaintiff had made herprimafacie case. This opinion
did conform to Watson in that the plaintiff must challenge a specific employment
practice.
130. 136 CONG. REC. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7,1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
131. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424
132. 136 CONG. REc. S15105 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
133. Id.
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that the committee believed were
alterations, included several key changes
34
necessary to avoid a presidential veto.
First, the final version of the bill compromised the definition of business
necessity in certain circumstances. Employers only needed to prove that the
challenged practices had a "significant relationship to a manifest business
objective," as opposed to having-a necessary relationship to the operation of
one's business, if the challenged "practices [did] not involve job performance
or selection or where they concern[ed] methadone, alcohol or tobacco
use.""35 Thus, this compromise relaxed the burden on employers if the
challenged practice did not concern an employee's job performance, such as
a practice aimed at improving safety, or if the challenged practice concerned
an employee's drug or alcohol use.
Second, the final version of the bill expressly prohibited any interpretation of the legislation that would have encouraged employers to use quota
systems."3 This "no interpretation encouraging quotas" addition arose after
the Bush administration announced that it would veto the legislation if the bill
encouraged the use of quota systems by employers.3 7 Although proponents
of the legislation did not believe the overruling of Atonio would result in the
use of quota systems, the joint committee added the "no interpretation
encouraging quotas" language to assure opponents of the legislation that their
quota fears would not materialize." 8
Finally, the bill retained the Watson and Atonio mandate requiring that
all disparate impact plaintiffs show the specific practices that caused the
statistical disparity in the work-force, as opposed to showing only that a
statistical disparity existed.'39 The plaintiff could have avoided this specific
practices requirement only if the employer could not produce the records
needed by the plaintiff to make such a determination."4 The specific
practices requirement is favorable to the employer because it makes plaintiff's
primafacie burden more difficult, but the mandate to employers regarding the
production of records would have had the effect of deterring employers from
concealing or destroying records needed by the plaintiff.
Opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1990 from the White House
increased during the compromise period. A Department of Justice spokesperson, Deputy Attorney General Donald Ayer, noted that the Bush adminis-

134. Id.
135. Id
136. Id.
137. 136 CONO. REc. S15105 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) (statement of Sen
Kennedy).
138. Id.
139. Id
140. Id.
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trati6n opposed the overruling of Atonio and also argued against the American
Bar Association's support of the legislation. 41 As evidenced by Ayer's
statements to the ABA and a letter to Senator Kennedy from Attorney General
Dick Thomburgh noting Thornburgh's intention to advise the President to veto
the legislation, a fear of encouraging the use of quota systems remained the
primary reason given by the Bush administration for its continuing opposition
to the legislation. 42
The fear of quota systems involves the belief that employers would
attempt to avoid disparate impact litigation, which is based on statistical
disparities, by resorting to hiring and promoting a certain percentage of
minorities and women. To the common employer, a quota system would
serve as the most fool-proof method of avoiding disparate impact litigation.
Simply put, "[i]f you [can be] sued by the numbers, .
hire by the num3
bers."

14

However, the Supreme Court held in City of Richmoid v. J.A. Croson
Co. that the use of quota systems is not justifiable absent a compelling
rationale.'
The use of quotas to avoid litigation is not the type of
compelling rationale contemplated by Croson. This is apparent because the
Supreme Court in Croson struck down the use of a quota where the justification, a history of public and private racial discrimination, seemed substantial.' 45 The Court deemed this insufficient to "justify the use of an
unyielding racial quota."'"
If a history of prior discrimination proved
insufficient to justify the use of a quota system, then the use of a quota simply
to avoid litigation clearly is not a sufficiently compelling rationale.
Thus, the bill's opponents' fears that employers would use quota systems
to avoid disparate impact litigation appear illogical because the use of a quota
for such a purpose would be illegal. Indeed, the threat to act unlawfully,
using quotas to avoid disparate impact litigation, should have the effect of
encouraging more diligent enforcement of the already existing law prohibiting
quotas as opposed to serving as a rationale for the veto of needed legislation.'47
However, the White House continued to state its belief that the

141. ABA Backs AbortionRights, Right to Die, and Job Protection,58 U.S.L.W.
2477 (Feb. 20, 1990).
142. Id.; 136 CONG. Rc. S15105, (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
143. Biskupic, Failureto Enact Civil RightsBillLaidto PoliticalMiscalculation,
48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3610, 3611 (Oct. 27, 1990) (quoting Sen. Alan K.
Simpson).
144. 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Middleton, supra note 61.
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civil rights bill was undesirable because it would encourage the use of
quotas."4 Specifically, the Bush administration stated that the new bill's
litigation rules were so overly technical and different from prior standards that
the legislation would provide too great an incentive to employers to use quota
149
systems.
Proponents of the bill urged against the President's plan to veto the bill,
citing Congress's good faith efforts to meet all reasonable objections to the
bill.'5 0 The aforementioned compromises, such as the "no interpretation
encouraging quotas" language, served as evidence of those good faith
attempts."u
However, the efforts proved insufficient to satisfy the White
House as on October 22, 1990, President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of
1990.'52 On October 24, 1990, all hope for the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 ended as the Senate's attempted override of the President's veto
failed by a single vote. u ' Displeased by the bill's failure, civil rights

activists vowed to return with similar legislation in 1991."'5
VII. CONCLUSION
The changes in the burden of proof defined in Watson and Atonio are not
merely technical adjustments to the standards used in employment discrimination cases. This Comment demonstrated that the practical effect of the
changes is a significant, one-sided gain in favor of employers who discriminate. In a turn to the right, the Supreme Court may have forgotten that their
decisions have practical effects. According to the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, over on6 hundred race discrimination claims against
employers were dismissed within the first few months following the Atonio
decision5 5 One critic commented, "[n]ight has fallen on the Court as far
56
as civil rights are concerned.',
With the attempted Civil Rights Act of 1990, Congress shed light on the
civil rights picture, but a President's veto and a failure to override that veto
blotted out the attempted stand against discrimination. Therefore, plaintiffs

148. 136 CONG. REc. S16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (President's veto message
on S. 2104).
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Biskupic, supra note 143, at 3610.
153. Id
154. Id
155. 136 CONG. REc. E229 (daily ed. February 7, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Hawkins).
156. 4 Civ. RTS. MONITOR No. 2, at 3 (Summer-Fall 1989).
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such as Emanuel, Watson, and Atonio will continue to suffer under the overly
stringent and misguided standards of proof imposed by the Supreme Court.
ROBERT L. NORTON
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